

Collaborative Approach to Effective Security Strategy Development

FEFPA Winter Conference 2019

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Session Objectives

- Through Discussion:
 - Identify Challenges with Securing Educational Facilities
 - Overcoming the Challenges
 - Define Process and Required Outcomes of an Effective TVRA
 - Prioritization Efforts
 - Develop Risk Mitigation Options
 - Evaluate the Effectiveness of Risk Mitigation Options
 - What level of risk remains?
 - What can be done to minimize?
- Benefits of Collaboration

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Challenges

Mind Set



- Can't Happen Here
- Unnecessary
- Negative Impact
 - Operations
 - Productivity
 - Accessibility
- Aesthetics
 - Building Design
 - Surrounding
- Funding Limitations
- No Specified Criteria
- Change to the Norm

Balanced Approach

- Will Happen Here
- Very Necessary
- Any impact is worth it
- Who Cares about Aesthetics??
- Find the Money
- Mandate Strict District/State-Wide Security Criteria
- Massive Change is required

Comprehensive Risk Assessment



Comprehensive Approach



Threat/Hazard Analysis

Discussion on threats and hazards

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Common Threats/Hazards Identified

- Vandalism
- Assaults/Fights
- Active Shooter
- Arson
- Burglary/Theft
- Robbery
- Bullying
- Suicide
- Drug/Alcohol Use
- Swatting Calls
- Illegal Weapons
- Sexual Assaults
- Hazmat (on-site, proximity, transportation routes)
- Work-place violence
- Improvised Explosive Devices
- Natural disasters/Extreme weather
- Violent/Disruptive Protests
- Vehicle Ramming
- Accidents


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Tactics are Important!

- In May 2002, the Secret Service published a report that examined 37 U.S. school shootings. They had the following findings:
- Incidents of targeted violence at school were rarely sudden, impulsive acts.
- Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea and/or plan to attack.
- Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.
- There is no accurate or useful profile of students who engaged in targeted school violence.
- Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused others concern or indicated a need for help.
- Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.
- Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.
- Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
- In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.
- Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.

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Sources for Threat/Hazard Identification



Vulnerabilities

- What are your vulnerabilities?

Common Vulnerabilities

Life Safety and/or Continuity of Operations

- Open access (large number of access points into buildings)
- Limited vehicle access control (parking in close proximity to structures/primary gathering areas)
- Building system accessibility (co-located and next to primary systems)
- Minimal security of on-site hazardous materials (labs, research facilities)
- Limited/No screening capabilities
- Public roads and on-property vehicle approach routes
- Limited/insufficient monitoring/detection/alert capabilities
- Glass facades

Common Vulnerabilities (cont.)

- Insufficient lock-down capabilities
- Large unprotected mass gathering areas (interior rooms, common areas, external open space)
- Existing security measures not utilized
- Lack of training in suspicious activity/item detection
- Limited suspicious activity reporting/tracking capability
- Limited/No mail screening measures/operations
- Emergency response planning and exercising gaps
- Disparate security systems
- Incomplete security strategy

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
Risk Mitigation

What's been successful?

Short Falls?

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Mitigation Measures-Prevention



Mitigation Measures-Mitigate

- Design
- Physical Security
- Technology
- Operations
- Response

Emergency Response
Strategy Objectives

- Prepare
- Emergency Response
- Recovery

Mitigate


Mitigation Measure Considerations

- Integral to workplace
 - Enhance facility use (how does personnel and public interact with security?)
- Designed and implemented to effectively reduce risk
- Integrated
- Sustainable day to day operations

The vast majority of countermeasures will never be called upon to thwart or mitigate an attack however, these same measures can have a profound impact, every single day, on the quality and attractiveness of the spaces

Mitigation Options



- Access Control
- Screening
- Monitoring
- Detection
- Response
 - Emergency ingress and egress
 - Shelter
 - Protection during evacuations, to include both routes and evacuation sites




TVRA Findings

- Report
 - What should we be concerned about?
 - How are we vulnerable to those concerns?
 - How concerned should we be?
 - What can we do to reduce risk?
- Verbal Brief
- Use renderings/VR
- Follow-up

Renderings



Renderings



Prioritizing Security Efforts

- Numerous Risk Management Matrices available
- CARVER+Shock
 - Criticality, Accessibility, Recoverability, Vulnerability, Effect, Recognizability, Shock
 - Existing matrix criteria (scales and scoring) available
 - Can be adapted to meet sector needs
 - Subjective
 - Requires collaboration

Prioritizing Security Efforts

- Setting realistic security goals & objectives
- Integrated solutions (understand the ‘ands/ors’)
- Develop ‘Step-Up Plans’ to account for increased threats
- Emergency response planning
- Engage local emergency response agencies
- Legal review

Collaboration

Integrated Diverse Expertise and Perspectives = Innovative and Effective Solutions

To develop effective and sustainable security strategies, while maintaining the vision of the development, security efforts must be balanced and take a collaborative approach, comprised of perspectives from:

- Ownership
- Leadership
- Facility Managers
- Designers
- Structural Engineers
- Security/LE Personnel/Security Professionals
- Community representatives
- Facility Users



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Lessons Learned

- Set your specific TVRA standards in RFPs/RFQs/Work Orders
- Become involved in the RFP/RFQ review process
- Consider threats, hazards, mitigation in design phase
- Set Security Strategy (long term)
- Mandate any new security technology integrates into the unified security platformHow 'likely' is the threat?
- Planning for the unknown
- No one-size fits all solution
- What Works?
 - "It Depends"
- Can't satisfy all demands
- Risk will remain
- Schools shootings can trigger powerful emotions that outweigh the odds

Lessons Learned

“Don’t mess up the end game”

Questions?